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As usual, the Tennessee appellate courts decided a considerable
number of tort cases last year, covering a wide variety of problems.
There were no striking new developments. In fact, the two decisions
which were awaited by the profession with the greatest interest, Kyker
v. General Motors Corporation' and Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of
Chattanooga,2 tend to slow down some modem developments. In the
Kyker case, it was indicated that manufacturers are not yet strictly
liable in Tennessee, at least on warranty grounds, without privity of
contract. In the Texas Tunneling case, a federal court undertaking
to apply Tennessee law placed definite restrictions on liability for a
merely negligent misrepresentation. Both of these decisions were
regarded with satisfaction by the conservative minded; and in view
of the fact that almost all of the new developments in tort law
during the past decade have been to the advantage of plaintiffs, it
may well be that the defendants are entitled to at least a temporary
breathing spell in the areas involved in these two decisions.
I.

NEGLIGENCE

A. The Standard of Care
1. Protectionof Golf Shelter from Lightning.-A novel fact situation
was presented in Davis v. Country Club, Inc.3 While the plaintiff, a
girl of fourteen, was playing on the defendants' golf course, a storm
arose, and she and her companion went to a weather shelter near
one of the greens. A bolt of lightning struck the shelter causing serious
injuries to the plaintiff. It was claimed that the defendants were negligent in locating the shelter on high ground, with the result that it was
more exposed to lightning, and in failing to provide lightning protection equipment for the shelter thus located.
The jury awarded 25,000 dollars to the girl, and an equal amount
to her father for expenses and loss of services, but the trial court set
aside these awards and directed verdicts for the defendants. This
action was affirmed, on the ground that there was no sufficient evidence of negligence. In support of this conclusion the court observed
that the bare possibility of harm was not enough to require the defendants to take precautions, and that the condition complained of
must be "dangerous according to common experience." There was
testimony that lightning is somewhat more likely to strike an object
on ground higher than the surrounding area, but on this point it was
concluded,
1. 381 S.W.2d 884 (Tenn. 1964). See text accompanying notes 52-59 infra.
2. 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964). See text accompanying notes 65-71 infra.

3. 381 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964), 32 TENN. L. REv. 329 (1965).
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Admitting that the possibility of the weather shelter being struck by lightning, because of its location, was more than an 'average' hazard, it would still
be very remote as shown by the infrequency of lightning striking the innumerable objects meeting the test of being in the open and being higher
than the surrounding ground.

While it is clear that the defendants owed the girl on the golf course
a duty of due care, as an invitee,4 this duty is violated only when
there is failure to guard against events reasonably to be anticipated.5
As remarked in an early Tennessee case, "Negligence consists in a
failure to provide against the ordinary occurrences of life, and the
fact that the provision made . . . is insufficient against an event such
as might happen once in a lifetime ... does not make out a case of
6

actionable negligence."
2. Malpractice-Some Risks Permitted Without Advice to Patient.In a malpractice case, Ball v. Mallinkrodt Chemical Works, 7 it appeared that plaintiff had high blood pressure, and that when she
failed to respond to treatment, her physician recommended a translumbar aortogram to determine whether the pressure was being caused by
a partial blockage of the renal arteries leading to the kidneys. The
defendant, a vascular surgeon, was called on to perform this test,
which involves forcing a contrast agent into the aorta, by means of a
needle thrust into its outer wall. Immediately after this test was
performed, the plaintiff suffered great pain, followed by permanent
paralysis in one leg. There was evidence that these injuries were
caused by the escape of some of the contrast agent into arteries feeding
the spinal cord. There also was testimony that other less toxic contrast
agents were available. Suit was brought against both the surgeon and
the manufacturer of the contrast agent.
The jury found for both defendants, and the plaintiff complained
on appeal of various instructions and jury findings. First, it was held
that the jury properly could find that there was no negligence by the
surgeon in his choice of contrast agent, even though the one chosen
was more dangerous than the others, since this agent permitted the
taking of better X-rays, and ordinarily was selected for that reason by
at least one-half of the surgeons performing aortograms. It was
observed that "where the treatment or procedure is one of choice
among competent physicians a physician cannot be held guilty of
malpractice in selecting the one which, according to his best judgment,
is best suited to the patient's needs."
4. Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1176, 1185 (1962).
5. PRossza, ToRTs § 31, at 149 (3d ed. 1964).
6. Illinois Central Ry. v Nichols, 173 Tenn. 602, 613, 118 S.W.2d 213, 217 (1937).
7. 381 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
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The plaintiff further claimed that the surgeon was negligent in
refusing to advise a patient of the danger of the test, since it appeared
that in about one percent of the cases serious injuries might result no
matter how skillful and careful the surgeon might be. The appellate
court approved an instruction that while the physician may not
minimize the dangers of a procedure to obtain the patient's consent,
he is not under any definite duty, "to explain every risk attendant upon
any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote," since this
"may well result in alarming a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who may, as a result, refuse to undertake the surgery
as to which there is, in fact, minimal risk."
With reference to the manufacturer of the contrast agent, it was
held that the trial court properly ruled that the drug was not misbranded even though it was referred to as "low toxicity." It was
observed that toxicity is a relative term, and the court concluded, "We
can not say that the brochure was false and misleading when it is
remembered that it was strictly a prescription drug, used only by
skilled surgeons."
3. Keys Left In Ignition-No Liability when Vehicle Left on Private
Land.-In Young v. Costner-EagletonMotors, Inc.," the court again
was faced with the problem of determining the liability of a car
owner who leaves his car unlocked and unattended, with the result
that a thief steals the car and then injures the plaintiff by his negligent
driving. In this new case the owner was a motor company, and the
car was left "either with the switch open or with a key in the switch"
on the defendant's private parking lot, where the public was invited to
inspect the vehicles offered for sale. In holding that a demurrer to
a complaint against the car owner was properly sustained, the court
indicated that its earlier holding in Justus v. Wood,9 involving a car
left unlocked on a public street in violation of a statute was based
on the violation of the statute ° with its stated purpose "to promote
highway safety." Furthermore, the denial of certiorari in the later
case of Teague v. Pritchard," was interpreted in the present case as
"approving the rule of absolute non-liability in the absence of an
ordinance or statute." The court pointed out that many thousands
of cars are parked by motor companies for the purpose of sale on
private lots, and concluded that a rule permitting the jury to find
liability in this situation would be impractical.
It may well be that too great a burden would be placed on motor
8. 379 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. 1964), 31 TENN. L. REV. 545 (1964).
9. 209 Tenn. 55, 348 S.W.2d 332 (1961); 29 TENN. L. REV. 468 (1962).
10. TmEN. CoDE: ANN.§ 59-863 (1956).
11. 38 Tenn. App. 686, 279 S.W.2d 706 (1954), 24 TENN. L. REV. 395 (1956).
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companies by requiring them to keep their cars locked in this situation
to avoid the risk of liability. It may be questionable, however,
whether the line should always be drawn at the point where a statute
or ordinance is involved. If a car is left with the keys in the ignition on
private land adjoining a tavern in an area frequented by criminals, or
next to a high school with a serious delinquency problem, and the
thief runs over some one in the excitement of his get-away, it is not
clear that the plaintiff should be faced with a rule of absolute nonliability. In general, even criminal actions do not place a result outside the risk if a jury could find that a result was foreseeable. 2 It
may be that the court should examine into each case to determine
whether or not there is a foreseeability issue for the jury, even though
no statute or ordinance is involved. In that connection the jury
could take into consideration not only the character of the neighborhood, but the period of time intervening between the theft and the
accident and other facts ordinarily considered in determining whether
or not the harmful result is within the risk created by the defendant. 13
In support, however, of a general rule of non-liability, it may be said
that even where theft of the unlocked car is foreseeable, there may
not be sufficient foreseeability that the thief will drive negligently,
even in the excitement of his escape.
B. ParticularRelationships
1. Duty of Landlord as to Undisclosed Dangerous Condition.-In
McGuffey v. Dotley,14 there was an application of the Tennessee rule
that a landlord must make some inspection of the premises. There the
plaintiff was injured when one of the front steps of his rented premises
gave way. It appeared that the step had been eaten about half
way through, from the underside, by termites. This damage could
have been discovered by stooping and looking into the open space
under the steps. The landlord's agent had briefly inspected the
premises about eight months earlier, prior to the beginning of the
plaintiff's tenancy, but had not discovered the danger. A paper boy
who used the steps about that time said he had noticed that a few
of the treads seemed a little weak.
Under these circumstances, it was held that the issues of negligence
and contributory negligence were properly left to the jury. It was
pointed out that under Pulaski Housing Authority v. Smith, 5 the
landlord was under a duty to use reasonable care to discover dangerous
12. RESTATEYNT, TORTS § 447-48 (1934); RtossER,

op. cit. supra note 5, § 51

at 311.
13. See Beene v. Cook, 43 Tenn. App. 692, 701, 311 S.W.2d 596, 600 (1957).
14. 381 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1964).
15. 39 Tenn. App. 213, 282 S.W.2d 213 (1955).
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defects. The court distinguished an earlier termite case, Glassman v.
Martin,16 where a verdict was directed for the defendant on the
ground that there the damage could have been discovered only by
punching the wood with a screwdriver or ice pick, while in the
present case, the defects could have been discovered by looking
in the open area underneath the stairs, and there was some evidence
that the treads were noticeably weak.
Since the tenant was under a duty to use due care, it was urged
that if the landlord was negligent, the tenant likewise was guilty of
contributory negligence under the rule developed in Willcox v. Hines.1
However, the court let the issue go to the jury, since the landlord may
have been more capable than the tenant of realizing the risk from a
discovered or discoverable condition.
2. Railroads-(a) Duty to Trespasser-HighwayMachine Extending
Over Track.-An unusual railroad accident was involved in Belcher v.
Tennessee Central Ry. Co.'8 The plaintiff was excavating a trench
across the highway, using for this purpose a tractor with a backhoe
on one end and a bucket on the other. At this point the highway ran
quite near the railroad track, and a few feet to the west, it crossed
the tracks. There was difficulty in seeing a train approaching from
the west because of a curve in the track, and because of undergrowth
between the track and highway. A train from the west struck the
backhoe and turned the tractor over, with resulting injuries to the
plaintiff.
It was alleged that the train was being operated at a dangerous
rate of speed; that the electric signals at the crossing did not operate
so as to give the plaintiff notice of the approaching train; that the
train was being operated without proper care; and that the trainmen
had failed to observe the requirements of the Railway Precautions
Act with reference to keeping a lookout and the duty when "any
obstruction appears on road" to sound the alarm whistle and make
every effort to stop.
It was held on appeal that a demurrer was wrongfully sustained and
that the declaration stated a cause of action for negligence both under
the common law and under the statute. With reference to the fact
that the plaintiff was a trespasser, it was pointed out that even under
the common law the railroad was under a duty of due care to trespassers, and that this duty involved keeping a reasonable lookout to
see whatever could be seen by a person of good eyesight, and to make
16. 196 Tenn. 595, 269 S.W. 908 (1954).
17. 100 Tenn. 538, 46 S.W. 297 (1898). See also Noel, Landlord's Tort Liability in
Tennessee, 30 TENN. L. REv. 368, 379 (1963).
18. 377 S.W.2d 928 (Tenn. 1964).
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the utmost endeavor to prevent a collision with any obstruction discovered.' 9 With reference to the Railway Precautions Act,20 it was
found that the allegations were sufficient to state a violation of the
provisions requiring a lookout, and of the duty, when any obstruction
should appear, to sound the alarm whistle and employ all means to
stop the train.
2
Since the statute now makes contributory negligence a defense, '
the defendant asserted that the declaration showed on its face that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. On this point the court
held that an issue for the jury was present. While under some circumstances, it might be contributory negligence as a matter of law to
proceed over the track in the face of an on-coming train, here the
poor visibility toward the west and the failure of the signal devices
at the cross-way to give the plaintiff the expected notice may have
been sufficient to prevent the plaintiff's conduct from being unreasonable.
(b) Evidence of Negligence and of Contributory Negligence.In Wallace v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.22 a truck driver was killed
when a locomotive coming at about forty-five miles per hour struck the
cab of his truck. The crossing was at the crest of a hill, so that the
tracks could not be seen by the driver until he was close to the
top of the hill. Visibility of trains coming from the west was to some
extent obscured by buildings, bushes, and saplings. There was conflicting testimony as to whether the driver, who lived 120 miles away,
but had worked nearby, was familiar with the crossing.
It was held that a directed verdict was properly denied. While
speed alone was said not to be enough to establish negligence on
the part of the defendant, the court found that "a high and dangerous
rate of speed in combination with a blind and dangerous crossing
presented a question of fact to be determined by the jury." With
reference to contributory negligence, it was found that decedent
ordinarily would be required to stop, look and listen for trains, but
this rule applied only "if he knew or in the exercise of ordinary care
should have known of the crossing." Since it could be found from the
evidence that he was not aware of the crossing, for adequate reasons,
this matter also was properly submitted to the jury.
C. Determinationof Cause in Factin MalpracticeAction
The case of Crowe v. Provost,2 illustrates some of the plaintiff's
19. Chattanooga Station Co. v. Harper, 138 Tenn. 562, 579, 199 S.W. 394, 398
(1917).
20. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 65-1208 to -1209 (Supp. 1959).
21. Noel, Torts-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L. REv. 1350, 1361-63 (1959).
22. 332 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1964).
23. 374 S.W.2d 645 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963), 31 TENN. L. REv. 531 (1964).
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problems of proof in a malpractice case, and how in some situations
these may be overcome without the necessity of expert testimony by
a fellow-physician. There a child of twenty-two months was brought
to the defendant's office and was given antibiotics without inquiry or
testing as to hypersensitivity. Shortly afterward the child became
seriously ill and lapsed into unconsciousness. He was brought back
to the physician's office while the doctor was home for lunch and a
practical nurse was in charge. After telephoning to the doctor that
the child was not much worse, and thus leading him to decide not
to return until after lunch, the nurse herself left the child with only
the receptionist in charge. A few minutes later the child vomited and
the receptionist raised him to an upright position, but when that
action seemed to shorten his breath, she laid the child down on
its back on the treatment table, although vomit and phlegm continued
to run out of its nose. The child died shortly before the doctor and
nurse returned to the office, and the plaintiff claimed that it died from
aspiration of its own vomitus.
It was conceded that the defendant nurse was negligent in the
course of her employment by defendant in leaving the unconscious
child, and the principal issue was whether or not this negligence
caused the death of the child. The nurse herself, together with a
registered nurse who was testifying for the plaintiff, said that the
child should not have been laid on its back, and that the child could
die from aspiration of its vomitus. The defendant physician, however,
and a number of other physicians who testified in his behalf, stated
that the child died from an overwhelming virus infection, although
they admitted that a person could die from aspiration of vomitus.
Under these circumstances it was held that the jury could find for
the plaintiff on the causation issue. The court stated that the weight
of the expert testimony was for the jury, and cited with approval a
statement that in some circumstances where the '"armful results are
sufficiently obvious as to lie within common knowledge, a verdict can
be supported without expert testimony." Doubtless the decision would
have been different if the causation issue had related to distinctly
technical matters, where a jury would be acting without substantial
evidence if its verdict was not supported by some medical testimony.
It was further found that while the plaintiff's argument to the
jury "that doctors will rally to the defense of a fellow doctor in a
malpractice suit" may have been improper, this did not sufficiently
affect the result to justify a reversal.

1965 ]
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II. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
A. Violation of Statute-Remote ContributoryNegligence
1. Pedestrian Crossing Highway.-In Templeton v. Quarles a
pedestrian was killed when hurrying across a three-lane highway a
few miles south of a small town. It was night, but a few buildings at
this point on the road had neon signs which lighted up the highway.
The road was straight for about a quarter of a mile to the south, to
the bottom of a hill. The defendant driver, coming up this hill, struck
with his right front fender the pedestrian who had almost completed
the crossing. The body was thrown about 118 feet and the defendant's
car laid down skid marks, starting near the point of impact, of about
96 feet in length. The jury, after appropriate instructions concerning
negligence and contributory negligence, proximate and remote, returned a verdict for the plaintiff, with the additional statement that
both the driver and the pedestrian were found to be negligent.
On appeal, it was held that the jury verdict had been properly
accepted as meaning that the jury found only remote contributory
negligence on the part of the pedestrian. It was urged that the
pedestrian was guilty of proximate contributory negligence as a
matter of law in view of his violation of the statute which requires a
pedestrian crossing a road where there is no crosswalk or intersection
to yield the right of way to all vehicles. It was held, however, that
whether or not under all the circumstances the decedent was guilty
of proximate contributory negligence was a question for the jury. It
was stated in that connection that the pedestrian's failure to keep an
adequate lookout "may constitute negligence per se, but it will not
necessarily do so under all circumstances."
Apparently, the duty to yield the right-of-way does not in all cases
involve the duty to discover the oncoming vehicle before starting to
cross the road, or if the vehicle is discovered, the duty in all cases
to estimate correctly the speed of the driver; or if such duties exist, the
decision indicates that the jury can find that the pedestrian's failure
to perform them in a particular case has contributed only remotely
to the accident. In connection with defendant's driving it was held
that his excessive speed could be inferred from the skid marks and
from the distance which the pedestrian's body was thrown by the
impact with the car.
Cases of this type suggest the desirability of a comparative negligence statute, even though a use of the remote contributory negligence rule may enable courts and juries to reach about the same
result in an indirect way.
24. 274 S.W.2d 654 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
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2. Cyclist Entering Highway from Driveway.-In another case the
court, by use of flexible proximate causation concepts, avoided the
harshness of the rule that contributory negligence is a complete bar
to recovery, even though both parties have contributed substantially
to the plaintiff's injury. In this case, Lowe v. Irvin,25 the plaintiff, a
boy of nine, was injured when he rode his bicycle from a private drive
onto the highway and collided with the defendant's automobile. It
was clear that the plaintiff had violated the statutes giving the right
of way in this situation to the motorist on the highway. 2 There also
was testimony indicating that the driver of the car had violated the
reckless driving statute,2 acting in willful or wanton disregard of the
safety of others by not keeping a lookout. He admitted after the collision, "I didn't see him until we had done hit." The physical conditions at the scene were such that the motorist could have seen the
boy, apparently in time to avoid him, if he had been looking ahead.
Under these circumstances the trial judge directed a verdict for the
defendant. This action was reversed on the ground that "even though
both parties be violating the law, it is still a question for the jury to
determine what the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the
injury was, and the violation of which one constituted the proximate
cause, applying the proper rule relating to contributory negligence of
a remote nature." (Italics added.)
Since one immediate cause of the accident was the plaintiff's failure
to yield the right of way as required by statute, the trial judge apparently considered that this was a case for application of the rule
that "a plaintiff who has violated a legislative enactment designed
to prevent a certain type of dangerous situation is barred from
recovery for a harm caused by a violation of the statute, if .... the
harm was sustained by reason of a situation of that type."28 The
unwillingness of the appellate courts to apply that rule in this case
seems based to a considerable extent on the youthfulness of the
plaintiff, for there are references to the instincts and impulses of
youngsters and the court finds "this young child so badly hurt, practically incapable of being guilty of negligence." The decision is not
actually based, however, on the ground that the boy was not negligent
in violating the statute. Nor was there any finding that the motorist,
although apparently he violated the statute against reckless driving,
was guilty of such gross or wanton negligence that ordinary contribu25. 373 S.W.2d 623 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963), 32 TENN. L. REV. 333 (1965).
26. TENN.CODE ANx. §§ 59-828 to -831 (1956).
27. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 59-858 (1956).
28. RESTATEMNT (SEcoND), ToRTs § 469 (1964).

Tennessee Survey, 15 VAND.L. REv. 952, 954 (1962).

See also Wade, Torts-1961
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tory negligence would not bar the action.2 The decision is placed on
the ground that a jury could find that the negligence of the defendant was the only proximate cause of the accident.
The principal authority for this handling of the matter was the
earlier decision in Adams v. Brown,30 where the accident occurred
as the plaintiff was attempting to pass the defendant's truck at a
rural intersection in violation of a statute. 31 The collision occurred
when the defendant, in violation of another statute,32 made a left turn
at the intersection without giving the required signal and without
making sure that the turn could be safely executed. The court there
permitted the jury to find that the negligence of the truck driver was
the sole proximate cause of the accident.
It was not possible in the present case to employ the last clear
chance doctrine, even under the more liberal application of that rule,
for here the plaintiff cyclist's disability until the time of the accident
was caused by his continued inattention rather than by any physical
helplessness. Under these circumstances, it is generally held, in all
except a few jurisdictions, that the plaintiff is not entitled to the
benefit of the last clear chance doctrine unless the defendant actually
well
discovers the plaintiffs perilous inattention, although there may
33
helpless.
physically
is
who
plaintiff
a
discover
to
be a duty
In the absence of a comparative negligence doctrine, it is fortunate
that cases of the present sort may still be sent to the jury, when the
negligence of the defendant seems considerably more grave than that
of the plaintiff, under instructions that they may find that the plaintiff's
contributory fault was not a proximate cause of the accident, even
though the connection in time and space is quite close and the statute
was designed to prevent the general kind of action involved. Perhaps
a simpler way to handle the problem of a statutory violation by the
plaintiff would be to say that this violation may, rather than must, be
regarded as negligence per se, depending on all the circumstances of
the particular case.34 This approach likewise permits the needed
flexibility in handling cases like the present one and Adams v. Brown.35
3. Motorist Entering Highway Without Right of Way.-In Hobbs
v. Livesay,36 the plaintiff drove into an intersection and collided
with an automobile owned by one of the defendants and driven by
29. See 19

TENN. L. REv. 795 (1947).
30. 37 Tenn. App. 258, 262 S.W.2d 79 (1953).
31. TEN. CODE § 2686(C) (1932).

32. TEN. CODE § 2682(C),(D)(1),(2),(6) (1932).
33. See 25 TEEN. L. Rmv. 515 (1958); 23 TEN. L. RBv. 916 (1955).
34. SEE RF_STATEmNT (ScoND), TORTS § 286 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1959), § 569(2)
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1963).
35. See Noel, Torts-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 VAND. L. REv. 881, 899-900 (1963).
36. 372 S.W.2d 199 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963), cert. denied, July 15, 1963.
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the other, his son. The defendants' car was on the plaintiff's right,
with the result that the defendants had the right of way.37 The
defendants' car, however, was being driven without lights after it had
become dark enough so that lights were required.
It was contended that the plaintiff was guilty of proximate contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to yield the right
of way, chiefly on the authority of Smith v. Murphy.38 In the present
case, however, the court observed that the jury had found that the
defendants' car, in approaching the intersection without lights, had
led the plaintiff to believe that he would encounter no other vehicle
in the intersection. This circumstance was enough to make the case
one for the jury on the issue of contributory negligence.
Likewise, in Arnett v. Fuston,9 recovery was allowed against a
driver who under ordinary circumstances would have had the right
of way. There a pick-up truck driven by the defendant collided
at an intersection with a car in which the decedent was a passenger.
The pick-up truck had the right of way, but there was evidence that
the truck had rammed the car in which the decedent was riding with
sufficient force to cave in one side and bulge out the other, almost
completely demolishing the car. In returning a verdict for 30,000
dollars against the defendant the jury added, "punitive damages of
from one to five years in prison."
The court held that the jury could infer from the evidence that
the truck was being driven "at considerable speed" across the intersection, and that the driver was intoxicated. It was further held that
the addition to the verdict recommending imprisonment was not
sufficient indication of passion or prejudice to require a setting aside
of the verdict, and that this addition was properly disregarded as
surplusage.
B. Imputed ContributoryNegligence
1. Wife's Negligence Imputed to Husband Where Agency Present.The case of Southern Railway Co. v. Butts,40 illustrates a natural reluctance on the part of a jury to apply the fictitious doctrine of imputed
negligence. There a wife was driving her husband home from work
in a station wagon owned by the husband. The wagon was struck
by a train at a crossing and both husband and wife were injured. The
defendant asked for an instruction that if the husband owned the
station wagon, and was in it while being driven by the wife, then
any negligence on the part of wife-driver was imputable to the
37.
38.
39.
40.

See TENN. CODE ANNt. § 59-828 (1956).
48 Tenn. App. 299, 346 S.W.2d 276 (1960).
378 S.W.2d 425 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
379 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. 1964).
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husband. This instruction was refused. The jury found for the husband and against the wife, evidently deciding that the defendant
railroad was negligent, that the wife-driver likewise was negligent,
and barred by her contributory fault.
Under these circumstances a new trial was ordered on the ground
that the verdicts were inconsistent. It was held that the requested
instruction about imputing the negligence of the husband to the wife
should have been given. Even under the instructions that were given,
since there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of control by
owner of station wagon, it was stated that the jury could not properly
have found for the husband unless it found the wife free from
contributory negligence. The decision thus applies the established
rule that negligence is imputed from an agent to a principal, for
reasons which remain obscure, although negligence will not be imputed from spouse to spouse merely because of the marital relationship.

41

2. Negligence of one Parent of Deceased Imputed to Other.-Imputed contributory negligence also was involved in a death action,
Smith v. Henson.42 There a young mother was working at defendant's
home and at the time taking care of her own young children, a girl
of three and a boy of two. Defendant asked her to drive his car home
from the office, and to then wash and clean the car. This involved
parking the vehicle on a steep driveway, since the defendant's home
was situated on a high hill overlooking a river. Shortly after parking
the car, she looked at it, saw that her children had entered it, and
also, that the vehicle was starting to roll down the hill. Vain efforts
were made to stop the car, and when it crashed, the small girl was
killed and the boy was seriously injured.
Demurrers to actions for the death of the girl and for the injury to
the boy were sustained. One basis for the decision was that the negligence of the mother in failing to park the car securely was the only
proximate cause of the accident. In that connection, it was not considered significant that the defendant had entrusted his car to an unlicensed driver, for on that point the court followed the prevailing rule
that "the mere fact an individual is unlicensed does not render the
owner of the automobile liable for the negligence of a borrower where
such fact has no causal connection with the injury or damage." This
rule seemed particularly appropriate in a situation where the car was
not actually being driven at the time of the accident, although it had
been carelessly parked shortly before.
41. Knoxville Ry. & Light Co. v. Vanglider, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S.W. 117 (1915);
Henniss, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 26 TEmN. L. REv. 531, 540, 547 (1959).
42. 381 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1964).
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With reference to the suit by the injured boy, it was pointed out that
if the defendant's liability was predicated on the negligence of his
servant, the mother, the defendant would be entitled to indemnity
from her as his servant, with the result that the recovery by the child
would be of no benefit to the mother. In any event, as the opinion
points out, it "has also long been the rule in this State that a minor
may not recover damages against a principal because of the negligence
of acts of the parent of a minor, which parent at the time was acting
as the agent of the principal."
The imputed negligence doctrine was used as an additional grounds
for denial of recovery in the wrongful death action. With reference to
recovery for the benefit of the mother, the court stated that this
would not be permitted when her own negligence contributed proximately to the death. It was further stated, on the authority of Nichols
v. Nashville Housing Authority,43 that "contributory negligence of one
parent of a child wrongfully killed, is imputable to the other so as to
preclude recovery by or for the benefit of the parents, or either of them
in an action for the death of the child." It might be added that the
rule of the Nichols case is a controversial one."

C. Risk of Obvious DangersAssumed
1. Private Hospital with Risks Apparent to Nurse.-The close relationship between the defense of voluntary assumption of risk and the
plaintiff's failure to prove negligence is evident in Pearce v. Canady."
There the plaintiff, a practical nurse, was employed at defendants'
hospital. Her patient was variously described as suffering from a
"bizarre neurological difficulty" and as "getting over a drunk." After
the patient insisted on going without aid to the bathroom, the plaintiff
heard him call in a weak voice and found him leaning against the
wall in the hallway just outside his room. After calling in vain for
other assistance, the plaintiff undertook to help the patient, a man
weighing about 185 pounds, although she herself was quite small.
While "walking" the patient to his bed, her leg twisted from under
her and in the resulting fall her leg was broken just below the knee.
The plaintiff asserted that a duty of due care was owed her as an
invitee, and that there was negligence in failing to provide enough
orderlies to render needed assistance in an emergency, and in other
43. 187 Tenn. 683, 216 S.W.2d 694 (1949).
44. Cf. Note, 2 VAND. L. REv. 722 (1949), concluding that the Nichols decision
"has much to justify it." See HARPER & JAmEs, ToRTs § 23.8, at 1283 (1956), stating

that rulings like that in the Nichols case "are altogether indefensible, and are being
increasingly rejected." See also Henniss, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 26 TENN,
L. REv. 531, 541-45 (1959).
45. 373 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963).
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respects, such as in the failure to have a bathroom near the patient's
room. In reversing a judgment for 5000 dollars against the defendants,
the court of appeals found that there was no sufficient evidence of
negligence or proximate causation. In any event, however, the court
considered that the plaintiff must be held to have assumed the risk
of this accident, since any dangers present were known or were
apparent to her. On this point the court stated that the owner of
premises "is not liable for injuries sustained from dangers that are
obvious, reasonably apparent or as well known to the invitee as to
the owner .... The invitee assumes all normal or obvious risks at-

tendant on the use of the premises."
While it may be that some of the alleged risks were not subjectively realized and assumed by the plaintiff, the decision still may be
rested on the related ground that there was no sufficient evidence
of causal negligence on the part of the defendants, in view of the
fairly obvious nature of the alleged dangers. On this point the court
stated that the only duty owed the plaintiff "was that of furnishing a
safe place to work and of warning her of any danger not known or
apparent to the plaintiff," and it was concluded that this duty had not
been violated. The decision illustrates how in its primary sense the
term assumption of risk "is only the counterpart of the defendant's
lack of duty to protect the plaintiff from that risk." 46
There does not seem to have been any contributory negligence in
this case, for it was not unreasonable for the plaintiff to agree to
work for a few days in a hospital with some apparent dangers, and
for the same reason it is doubtful whether there was any unreasonable
assumption of risk. The case seems different in this respect from Peters
v. Tennessee Central Railway,47 where the plaintiff consented to face
a hazardous condition for a period of six or seven years. If, however,
there was no breach of duty toward the plaintiff, the absence of contributory fault is immaterial.
2. Premises where Condition but not Danger Obvious.-In Ballinger
v. I. V. Sutphin Co.,48 the plaintiff was a demurrage clerk employed by
an agency of the railroads to examine freight cars on sidings, ascertaining whether they were loaded or empty and whether demurrage
charges were due by reason of prolonged possession of the car. While
walking around a car on the defendant's land, after a rainy night, he
slipped and fell, breaking his hip. There was testimony that the land
was muddy, and that slick green moss formed in places where the
water had formed.
46. Fleming, Assumption of Risk, 61 YALE L.J. 141 (1952).
47. 179 Tenn. 509, 167 S.W.2d 973 (1942).
48. 332 F.2d 436 (6th Cir. 1964).
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The court first found that the plaintiff was an invitee toward whom
there was a duty of due care, since he was on the premises with
reference to a matter of mutual business interest and came within the
definition of a business guest as "a person who is invited or permitted
to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with the business dealings between
them." 9 Consequently, there was a duty toward the plaintiff to keep
the premises in safe condition, and the main issue was whether or
not the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of
law. In upholding the refusal of the trial court to so charge, the
court noted that while the presence of the mud may have been obvious,
there was no evidence that the plaintiff was aware of the additional
risk from the slick moss which had been permitted to grow up where
water was allowed to stand. The case was therefore distinguishable
from one where the plaintiff was completely familiar with the dangerous conditions which caused the fall. If the fall had occurred simply
on account of the mud, it would seem that the plaintiff still might not
be guilty of contributory fault, since it was his duty to examine the
cars in wet as well as in clear weather; but it then might have been
difficult to establish that the defendant's premises were unreasonably
dangerous, if walking in this area was infrequent.
III.

PRODucTs LLBmmrry

A. ManufacturerNot Liable in Warranty Without Privity.-Perhaps
the decision of greatest interest during the survey period was Kyker
v. General Motors Corp.,50 which cleared up, to some extent at
least, the confusion created by the denial of certiorari in General
Motors v. Dodson.51 In the Dodson case a lady who had purchased
an Oldsmobile from an authorized dealer, Kemp, was injured when
the brakes suddenly locked. She sued the manufacturer for breach of
express and implied warranty and recovered. The verdict for the
plaintiff was upheld on the grounds that "the jury could have found
that General Motors was the actual person with whom the plaintiffs
were dealing, and Kemp was a conduit or subterfuge by which
General Motors tried to exempt itself from liability to the consumers
who are the plaintiffs." On a petition to re-hear, further consideration was given to the point that there may in fact, have been no
privity between General Motors and the plaintiff. The court concluded,
however, that the practical effect of the automobile sales plan was
49. RESTATEMENT,
court.
50. Supra note 1.
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§ 332 (1934). This section was cited and applied by the

51. 47 Tenn. App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
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that "General Motors gave the warranty to the ultimate consumer"
even though "General Motors dealt only with its dealers and never
with the purchasers who are in fact the beneficiaries of the warranty."
It was possible to interpret the Dodson case restrictively because
of evidence that the manufacturer had actual knowledge that the
plaintiff's car "was dangerously defective in its braking system" and
failed to warn the plaintiff of this danger. Under that view the case
simply reaffirms the settled principal that a manufacturer is liable
for misrepresentation without privity of contract if he sells a product
with actual knowledge of a dangerous defect. 52 In fact, however, the
court went on to use language characteristic of modem decisions
dispensing with privity in warranty cases generally, at least where the
manufacturer has engaged in wide-spread advertising. It was stated
in that connection that such advertisements made to the ultimate
consumer "form a part of the warranty which General Motors gives
the ultimate consumers." This language led many to think that the
Dodson case was intended to impose on manufacturers a strict liability to 53remote users or consumers of their products, on warranty
grounds.
In the Kyker case, the supreme court itself gives the Dodson case
this interpretation, stating that it was there held that the sales act
"created an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the consumer,
in a situation where the manufacturer was not the plaintiff's vendor."
In the Kyker decision, however, the court goes on to say that this
holding represents an erroneous construction of the sales act, and
concludes, "we do not think the provisions of the Uniform Sales of
Goods Act were ever intended to, or should, define the rights, remedies and liabilities of a purchaser as against a manufacturer who is not
his immediate vendor or a party to the contract of sale." Consequently the recent federal decision in Berry v. American Cyanamid,54
seems correct in concluding "that Tennessee has not abolished the
requirement of privity" in warranty cases.
While the Kyker case makes it clear that the remote purchaser cannot recover against the manufacturer on warranty grounds, it says
nothing as to whether or not strict liability might be imposed upon the
direct tort theory adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., and
by the American Law Institute.5 There are a number of recent de52. Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 150 S.W. 421 (1912);
1 HUnSH, A mucA_ LAw OF PRODucTs Lm, nxry § 6.64, at 116 (Supp. 1964).
53. See, e.g., PnossER, TORTS, op. cit. supra note 5, § 97 at 675, 677. I FRmUmE &
FRmDmA,,
PRoDuCTs Lknnrnr § 16.04(2)(IX), at 416 (1960, Supp. 1964).

54. 341 F.2d 14 (6th Cir. 1965).
55. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
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cisions, other than the Greenman case, which have taken this position. 7
Since about half of the states have imposed strict liability without
privity on manufacturers on one ground or another during recent
years,- it is quite possible that the Tennessee court may in an appropriate case take this position, particularly with reference to
manufacturers of food or drink, or of products for intimate bodily use,
where decisions of longer standing from other jurisdictions support
the imposition of liability without fault on the manufacturer.5 9
B. ContaminatedBeverage-Res Ipsa Not Applied
In Phipps v. Carmichael,6 the courts were presented with another
case in a long series based on harm from contaminated beverage
bottles. In this most recent decision, it appeared that cases of soft
drinks were delivered by the defendant bottling company to the home
of one Nimms about twice a week. The home was surrounded by a
six foot fence, with a locked gate, to which Mrs. Nimms had the key.
Some time later Nimms took the bottles and placed them in a barrel.
The barrel was placed in the back end of Nimm's bus, where it remained until the next day, except when Nimms himself opened the
barrel to put in some ice.
While Nimms was transporting cotton pickers in his bus he sold
drinks to the workers, who carried their own lunches. When the
plaintiff purchased the bottle in question, Nimms uncapped it. As the
plaintiff was drinking the beverage, her daughter noticed a foreign
object in the bottle, which on examination looked like a hair pin. The
plaintiff drank no more from the bottle, but later in the day became
nauseated and, "upon her return home that evening became even
sicker."
Suit was brought for 10,000 dollars against the bottler on negligence
grounds, and after a second trial a verdict was directed for the
defendant. This action was confirmed on the authority of Coca-Cola
Bottling Works v. Sullivan.!" The court referred to the requirement
laid down in that case that negligence could not be presumed unless
the plaintiff introduced not only some evidence of lack of tampering,
57. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427 (N.D. Ind. 1965);
Putnam v. Erie City Mfg. Co., 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964); Deveny v. Rheem Mfg.
Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp. 12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). See also Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers,50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1946).
58. See Noel, Products Liability of Retailers and Manufacturers in Tennessee, 32
TENN. L. REv. 207, 208 (1965); See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19
S.W. L.J. 5, 12 (1965).
59. See PRossun, TORTS § 97, at 675 (3d ed. 1964).
60. 376 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1963), 32 TENN. L. REv. 341 (1965).
61. 178 Tenn. 405, 158 S.W.2d 721 (1942).
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but enough to make it appear "by a clear preponderance of the
evidence that there has been no such divided or intervening control
of the bottle as to afford any reasonable opportunity for it or its
contents to have been tampered with by another after it left the
possession or control of the defendant or its agents." In the present case
the court thought that this high standard of proof had not been met
because the bottles may have been tampered with while on Nimm's
back porch. While the gate was usually locked, and Mrs. Nimms had
the key, the failure of Mrs. Nimms to testify as to whether or not
there were opportunities for tampering was regarded as significant.
In response to an argument that the requirements of the Sullivan
case had been somewhat relaxed by later decisions, the court concluded, "The Sullivan case is still the law of Tennessee, and this court
is bound by it." While there has been some tendency to relax the
standard of proof in explosion cases, 62 the present decision indicates
that in contamination cases the standard of proof still is quite strict,
notwithstanding the decision in Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc. v.
Glab,63 the only recent contamination case in which the court has
allowed the jury to find negligence.
The claim in the present case, where the plantiff did not actually
swallow the hair pin, does not seem a particularly strong one, and it
is not surprising that the court was unwilling to relax the standard of
proof in this situation. As has been pointed out, the court is more concerned with problems of tampering and of fraudulent and exaggerated
claims in the foreign substance cases, than in the explosion ones, where
injury is unquestionably due to the explosion, and often is quite
serious.64
IV.

MISEPRESENTATION-1ESTICTION OF LIAlnrry FOR NEGLIGENCE
65 was con-

The case of Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga,
sidered two years ago in this survey.66 The basic complaint was that
the defendants, a firm of engineers, by their negligence in preparing
some drawings for the city, had misled the plaintiff. These drawings
62. See Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Mason, CCH Foo), DRUG & Cos M.nxcs L. REP.

1111
22,621,

23,607 (Tenn. App. 1959), cert. denied; 27 TENIN. L.

R.Ev.

622 (1960).

See

also Noel, supranote 58, at 232.
63. CCH FooD, DrUG & CosMarcs L. REP. ff 22,475 (Tenn. App. 1956), cert.

denied, Mar. 8, 1957, 28 TENN. L. REv. 444 (1959).
64. See Wade, Torts-1957 Tennessee Survey, 10 VAND. L. REV. 1221, 1218 n.18
(1957). As there suggested, "when plaintiff's 'injury' is doubtful the requirement in
the Sullivan case may still be imposed."
65. 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964).
66. See discussion of the district court opinion, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1926),

in Noel, supra note 35, at 881, 890, 905-07, where the facts are more completely
stated. See also 16 VAND. L. REv. 266 (1962).
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were used, as was intended, by contractors in making bids for some
work, and by the plaintiff subcontractor, who agreed to dig a sever
through a hill. The drawings purported to include the results of a
number of test borings, but with regard to two of the borings near
the center of the hill, the drawings omitted to give results showing
an unusual amount of rock at these points. As a result of these omissions the plaintiff believed that the work could be done in about
half the time it actually took, and that the cost would be some
$17,730 less than the expense in fact incurred. The plaintiff was
allowed by the trial court to recover damages from the negligent
engineers, even though no intentional falsehood was involved.
This holding was reversed by the court of appeals, which concluded
that "up to now the Tennessee Courts have not extended the reach of
tort claims for fraud and deceit to embrace such a suit as is involved
here" and that "to impose liability would require this Court to fashion
a rule not yet adopted in Tennessee." The appellate court found
confirmation for this opinion in the case of Howell v. Betts,67 rendered
by the Tennessee Supreme Court, after the trial court's decision,
although that case has been considered by commentators as "not
inconsistent" with the trial court's opinion and not "restrictive of its
68
holding."
In fact, the opinion of Howell v. Betts seems definitely to accept
the view that there is a duty of due care, without privity of contract,
not only with reference to personal injury and property damage, but
with reference to intangible interests. The court there stated that
"such a duty and consequent liability have been imposed on a defendant in favor of a plaintiff not in privity where the risk of harm from
negligent performance of a contract was to an intangible interest of
such plaintiff." In support of this proposition the court cited the leading case allowing recovery for negligent misrepresentation, Glanzer v.
Shepard,69 which definitely supports recovery when information is
negligently supplied for the guidance of a class of persons, even
though there was no intent to deceive, and even though the particular plaintiff is not known to the defendant. Recovery was denied
in Howell v. Betts only because the carelessly prepared survey on
which the plaintiff relied in purchasing land had been prepared
for a former owner back in 1934. Under these circumstances the
court concluded that the liability could not be extended to "an
67. 211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).
68. See Wade, Torts-1963 Tennessee Survey, 17 VAND. L. REv. 1173-74 (1964).
See also Susano, The Action of Deceit in Tennessee, 30 TENN. L. REv. 624, 634 (1963),
stating, "The holding in the Texas Tunnelling Co. case was accepted by implication
in the subsequent case of Howell v. Betts, [211 Tenn. 134, 362 S.W.2d 924 (1962).J."
69. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922); REsTATEMrNT, ToRTs § 552 (1934).
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unforeseeable and remote purchaser 24 years after the survey" without
extending liability to "all purchasers to the end of time." In that
connection the court cited Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,70 which holds
that a balance sheet negligently prepared by accountants for use in a
wide variety of transactions should not lead to "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class."

It would seem that the facts in the Texas Tunneling case resemble
those in Glanzer v. Shepard more closely than those in the Ultramares

case or in Howell v. Betts. The parties in the present case had in mind
a definite and limited class of persons, the bidders for a particular
contract, who would within a short time rely on the drawings. There
could be only one successful bidder for the tunnelling work, and the
amount of that bidder's loss would be limited to the cost involved in
removing the rock which the defendants negligently failed to indicate
on their drawings. The opinion in the Ultramares case was not based
on the fact that the defendant's accountants did not know the name
of the persons to whom the balance sheet would be shown, but on
the fact that the balance sheet was to be used in a wide variety of
transactions. As indicated in the Restatement of Torts,71 which approves the district court opinion in the Texas Tunneling case in
illustration 5, a requirement that the plaintiff be identified and known
to the defendant seems too narrow.
It is believed that the general tenor not only of Howell v. Betts,
but of earlier Tennessee cases gives at least as much support to the
negligence rule followed by the district judge as to the traditional one
applied by the court of appeals. While the final decision receives some
support from the fact that the information furnished was not "guaranteed" and the bidders were referred to further plans on file in the
engineer's office, it appears that there was no objection to the district
judge's finding that the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory
negligence, and the appellate court does not undertake to set aside
that finding.
Although the defendants prevailed in this case, it is evident that the
law in this area is in a developing state and that engineers and others
in the business of supplying information cannot indefinitely expect
others to pick up the bill for losses caused by their mistakes, or those
of their unidentified employees. Despite this decision the refuge for
careless incompetence gradually is becoming less secure.
70. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
71. RESTATEMENT (SEcOm), TORTS 552 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1962).
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DEFAMATION

A. Slander per se-Chargeof Crime
The case of Dunneback v. Williams 72 deals with an accusation of
crime as slander per se, and illustrates that in this jurisdiction the
charge must be quite specific if it is to be actionable on that ground.
It appeared that the mayor of Mount Pleasant, at a regular meeting
of the board of commissioners, made the statement, after failing to find
something in the minutes of the city, that the plaintiff, the city manager, should be dismissed. When the city manager asked why he
should be dismissed, the defendant replied, "For taking a page from
the minute book, altering the minutes and for lying." It was alleged
73
that these words charged a felony under the criminal statutes.
Two defenses were asserted: (1) that the words were absolutely
privileged because spoken at a regular meeting of the board of commissioners by the mayor in the course of a legislative proceeding; and
(2) that there was no charge of a criminal offense, with the result that
the words were not actionable in the absence of proof of special
damages.
In upholding a demurrer to the declaration the court restricted4
its consideration to the second defense, involving the charge of crime2
In that connection the court pointed out that the removal of material
from the minute book was made felonious only if this was done "with
intent to injure or defraud." It was then held that no charge of this
crime had been made because the "words spoken by the defendant do
not state with what intent the plaintiff was charged with taking a
page from the minute book or altering the minutes." The earlier cases
on this matter indicate that the words spoken need not state the
charge with all the precision of an indictment; it is enough that the
bystander reasonably understands the words as definitely charging
the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, 75 and this is the generally
accepted rule.7 6 More recently, however, the courts in this jurisdiction
77
have required that the accusation of crime be quite specific.
With reference to the privilege point, it ordinarily is held that a
statement made during the proceedings of subordinate legislative
bodies, such as a municipal council, are only conditionally privileged.
72. 381 S.W.2d 909 (Tenn. 1964).
73. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1942, 39-4207 (1956).
74. It may be recalled that Tennessee follows the rule that the crime charged must
be one which is both indictable and involves moral turpitude. Smith v. Smith, 34 Tenn.
473 (1854).
75. Ibid.; Tompkins v. Wisener, 33 Tenn. 458 (1853).
76. PRossan, op. cit. supra note 59, § 107 at 774.
77. Smith v. Fielding, 205 Tenn. 313, 326 S.W.2d 476 (1959), 27 TENN. L. REV. 435

(1960); Cheatham v. Patterson, 125 Tenn. 437, 145 S.W. 159 (1911).
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It is considered that these proceedings are not within the policy underlying the absolute immunity attached to federal and state legislative
proceedings, and that members of these subordinate bodies are
sufficiently protected if they are exempted from liability for statements
made in good faith, without malice.7 1
B. Libel per se-Defamationof a Corporation
The case of Electric Furnace Corp. v. Deering Milliken Research
Corp.7 9 brings out some basic points about the law of libel. It was
there found that the trial court had correctly instructed the jury as
follows: "Vhere the defamatory nature of the writing does not appear
upon the face of the writing, but rather appears only when all of the
surrounding circumstances are known, it is said to be libel per quod
as distinguished from liable per se, and in such cases damages are
not presumed by must be proven before the plaintiff can recover."80
It was further found to have been properly stated by the trial judge
that for defamation of a corporation the false statement "must reflect
in a defamatory manner upon the conduct, management, or financial
condition of the corporation."
A judgment for the plaintiff for 6240 dollars compensatory damages
and 125,000 dollars punitive damages was, however, set aside on appeal, and the case remanded for a new trial, because of error in the
computation of damages. There was confusion between loss of gross
receipts and loss of profits, and even to the extent that loss of
profits was shown, there was no sufficient evidence that this loss was
due to the defamation rather than to apprehension by customers that
they might become involved in a patent dispute properly referred to
by the defendant in the defamatory letter. Since there was no sufficient proof as to compensatory damages, the award of punitive damages
also had to be set aside, for the reason that punitive damages cannot
be allowed in an action for libel per quod unless there is proof of
special damage.
VI. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Malicious Prosecution
There is a close relation between the torts of malicious prosecution
and defamation, for when criminal or even civil proceedings are
initiated against a person, it is evident that this is likely to affect his
reputation. Both the similarity between these actions, and an essential
difference between them is brought out in the recent case of Ryerson v.
78. PRossEB, op. cit. supranote 59, § 109 at 801.

79. 325 F.2d 761 (6th Cir. 1963).
80. See also Paine, Defamation-Libel Per Se Doctrine, 30 TENN. L.

REv. 466 (1963).
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American Surety Co.81 There it was alleged that the defendant had
instituted a civil action against the plaintiff, a Certified Public Accountant; that the action had terminated in the plaintiff's favor; that it
was brought maliciously, without probable cause; and that as a
result of the lawsuit the plaintiff incurred certain expenses and "suffered injury to his professional reputation as a C.P.A." Plaintiff further
alleged that the slightest investigation would have revealed that the
allegations made against him in the original suit were not true.
The defendant demurred to the declaration on the ground that
the statements complained of were made about the plaintiff in the
course of a judicial proceeding, and, so long as relevant to the proceeding, were absolutely privileged. The trial judge sustained the
demurrer, but was reversed because the suit was not for defamation,
but for malicious prosecution. As the court points out, the plaintiff's
action was not based on false statements made about him, but on the
improper initiation of a lawsuit. The plaintiff's allegations that certain
statements made about him were false and defamatory were made
simply "in order to help make out an element of his action, e.g.,
malice or lack of probable cause; but the false statements would only
be evidence of the element sought to be shown."
The opinion incidentally brings out that Tennessee, ever since the
decision in Lipscomb v. Shofner,82 has followed the modem rule that
an action for malicious prosecution may be brought for wrongful
initiation of an ordinary civil suit. In such a case, however, as distinguished from one based on malicious institution of a criminal prosecution, no damages will be presumed, and the plaintiff must
damages in excess of the costs recoverable in the original
establish
83
action.
B. Trespass-Removal of LateralSupport
In Morris v. Ostertag,8 the purchaser of a plot in a subdivision was
allowed recovery for harm caused by the excavation of adjoining land
for the purpose of building a road, even though the deed showed the
purchased lot to be bounded by a street. The court stated that "the
right of a landowner to have his soil sustained by that adjacent to it
is an absolute right." It was found that there could be recovery "without proving negligence or want of skill," and whether the removal of
support was by an adjoining landowner, or by someone else. A defense
that the harm was done by an independent contractor was unsuccessful
81.
82.
83.
84.

213 Tenn. 182, 373 S.W.2d 436 (1963).
96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896).
Ibid.; PROSSim, op. cit. supra note 59, § 114 at 875.
376 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1963).
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for the reason that defendant, who employed the contractor, had
directed the removal of the lateral support, and the injury to the
paintiff's land was a direct and probable consequence of the work
the contractor was instructed to perform.
C. Damages-Remittur-NoInstructionas to Non-taxibility of Award
In Dixie Feed & Seed Co. v. Byrd,5 the principal questions were

whether the trial judge correctly refused to instruct the jury that any
recovery by the plaintiff would not be subject to federal income taxes,
and whether a verdict for 380,000 dollars, considerably higher than
any before rendered in this state, was excessive.
As to the income tax point, the court decided, in this case of first
impression, to follow the majority view that the tax exemption is not
to be considered by the jury. One reason for this decision was that the
contrary view tends to nullify the tax benefit apparently intended by
Congress in exempting from taxation, damages for personal injuries.
Furthermore, if account were taken of taxes this "would inject into
the already difficult and complicated computation of such damages
factors which change from time to time, such as the rate of taxation
and the number of plaintiff's exemptions, and allow juries to indulge
in speculation and conjecture in arriving at the amount to be
deducted."
This conclusion is in harmony with the collateral source rule, which
also was applied in this case. Under that rule the defendant may not
show payments of wages or sick benefits made to the plaintiff during
his incapacity, since these do not relate to the loss of ability to earn
for which the plaintiff must be compensated. It is evident that tax
deductions also are not directly related to the actual loss of earning
power.
With reference to the amount of the verdict, the court considered
the extent of the injuries, which involved paralysis from the navel
down, with the resulting loss of ability to control kidney and bowel
action, and loss of sexual powers. The plaintiff was fifty-nine years
old and earned 6000 dollars a year. In suggesting a remittur to 290,000
dollars, the court was influenced by the fact that the estimated costs
for nursing, 191,736 dollars, were figured on the assumption that the
continuous services of a practical nurse would be needed, while in fact,
the attendant would simply have to be on call, and would not have
to be a practical nurse.
It was pointed out that in view of the plaintiffs paralysis the pain
would not be commensurate with the other elements of damage.
The court also may have been influenced by the fact that apparently
85. 376 S.W.2d 745 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1963), 31
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there was no attempt to discount the face amount of the various items
of recovery. At age fifty-nine it may be that even the amount to which
the judgment was reduced, after deduction of attorney's fees and
expenses, still might supply the plaintiff with a substantial annuity.8
The court did not emphasize that the verdict was in excess of any
heretofore approved. This seems wise in view of the diminished purchasing power of money and the seriousness of the injuries. About
the only test to guide the courts in this area is that the verdict will
not be disturbed "unless it is plainly so unreasonable as to shock the
judicial conscience."87
86. See the annuity table set forth in 1 TEN. CODE ANN. 1153, 1157 (1956).
87. Yellow Cab Co. v. Pewitt, 44 Tenn. App. 572, 584, 316 S.W.2d 17, 22 (1958).

